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a b s t r a c t
After more than a decade of frantic R&D efforts, Cognitive Radio (CR) technology continues
to fail to pass the ﬁrst developmental milestone of a working prototype, suggesting that the
CR innovation process may be stalling. This paper analyzes possible reasons for this
situation from the perspective of innovation management and economics. The CR
innovation process has developed in a complex environment shaped by a combination
of technology-push and market-pull forces. This paper shows that this process is being
stiﬂed by two barriers emerging from the current reliance of CR technology on opportu-
nistic dynamic spectrum access as the sole means for entry into the wireless market. The
technology-push is affected by the barrier of technological complexities linked to the
requirement to protect highly sensitive incumbent systems. The market-pull forces are
being negated by market lock-in and a strong status quo of well-established wireless
players. This paper argues that overcoming these barriers and revitalizing the practical
development of CR could be possible with the aid of light-touch governmental interven-
tion. This could take the form of designating a dedicated CR band, which would beneﬁt CR
through less strict spectrum access requirements. A vibrant cognitive environment could
ﬂourish in this type of band, supporting CR innovation.
& 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
It has been more than a decade since the concept of Cognitive Radio (CR) was coined by Mitola (2000). It quickly
became the most fashionable topic in the ﬁeld of wireless research, with explosive growth in the numbers of conferences
and publications dedicated to this subject. Regardless of the hype and frantic research activity, however, the advancement
of CR to the market seems to proceed too slowly, as evidenced by R&D efforts that remain largely limited to academic
environments and the continued lack of appropriate radio frequency (RF) front-end offerings (Pawelczak, Nolan, Doyle, Oh, &
Cabric, 2011). This paper analyzes possible reasons for this sluggish progress from the perspective of innovation management
and economics, with the aim of recommending suitable policies to boost further andmore fertile developments of CR technology.
Presently, a plethora of deﬁnitions of CR exists. The authors adopt the holistic deﬁnition of CR as a radiocommunications
device or a network of such devices that possesses full awareness of its operational context: the real-time situation with
radio environment, the communication requirements of its user, the applicable regulatory policies and the device’s own
capabilities. CR uses this information to make autonomous decisions on how to conﬁgure itself for the communications task
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at hand (Doyle, 2009). Hence, in the context of this paper, CR represents a signiﬁcant evolutionary step from traditional
radiocommunication systems. The autonomous, cognitive re-conﬁguration of CR opens up opportunities for new business
models in the wireless communications marketplace built on the novel utility proﬁles of CR.1
As an innovative technology, CR must progress through several developmental milestones. The ﬁrst of these is the
delivery of a working prototype (Suarez, 2004).2 However, it appears that after more than a decade of extensive R&D
efforts, CR still largely fails to pass the maturity test of producing a solid working prototype. Hence, industry watchers have
sounded warning bells (Pawelczak et al., 2011).
It may be surmised that some systemic deﬁciencies exist, the reverse salient barriers (Hughes, 1987) in the
composition and functioning of an eco-system of CR innovation that restrain the impetus of CR development. In their
technical essence, both of the fundamental components of CR – the re-conﬁgurable radio hardware and the processors to
run it with the help of software – are well-known modern technologies. Thus, in terms of technology, the challenge of CR
boils down to designing suitable software algorithms to convert reconﬁgurable radios into proper CR. Why, after more
than a decade as one of the most popular research topics in wireless R&D, does CR technology remain an elaborate concept
rather than existing as a working prototype and establishing itself as an innovation that might bring tangible (commercial)
beneﬁts?
To address this question, this study focuses on the technology-push and demand-pull processes (Nemet, 2009) as
applied to CR and discusses the barriers that may be stalling CR innovation. The rest of this paper is structured as follows.
The following section considers the evolutionary role of CR innovation and analyzes its forces and dynamics to identify
reverse salient barriers. The third section discusses the ﬁndings and proposes interventional policy measures, such as the
designation of a dedicated CR band, which may enliven the technological innovation of CR and hasten its market
introduction. The ﬁnal section offers some concluding observations and ideas for future developments.
2. CR innovation and business development
2.1. Evolutionary role and forces of CR innovation
Given the stalling progression of CR to the market, it may be of interest to consider why this issue is important in
already highly competitive wireless markets. Therefore, this begins from the tenets of evolutionary economics. Metcalfe
(1994) postulated that any sustainable economic development is intrinsically linked to the dynamic interplay between the
processes of variety (providing the necessary breadth of innovative options to the market) and selection (the market
opting for a preferred alternative among competing solutions).
In the context of modern wireless markets, it can be argued that CR represents an important new option that
contributes to a variety of competing technological solutions. Accordingly, the aforementioned stalling of CR innovation
could point to the existence of market failure conditions and may call for policy intervention.
The evolutionary perspective leads us to consider two complementary yet distinct strategic forces shaping the
dynamics of innovation and impacting the transfer of technology from the research laboratories to the market. The ﬁrst
of these forces can be described as the technology-push, which explains technology transfer as motivated by means.
In this process, the sheer technological superiority of the innovation compared with traditional technologies dictates its
broad acceptance by an industry. A second contributing force is characterized as a demand-pull or market-pull, the
intensity of a market proposition and a commercial promise of a new technology (Nemet, 2009). It may be hypothesized
that the halting dynamics of CR innovation may be connected to deﬁciencies in the workings of one or both of these
forces.
2.2. Faults of the CR technology-push
The main impetus of the classical technology-push is built on the premise of the technological soundness and
superiority of new innovative solutions compared with existing state-of-the-art technologies. This usually requires a
clearly formulated technological concept and an initial working prototype that can pass the elaborate testing of the market
and convince stakeholders of the emergence of a new, dominant technological design (Suarez, 2004; Teece, 1986). Thus,
the fact that there still does not exist an unambiguous deﬁnition of CR, let alone a working prototype, suggests that
something may be obstructing the technology-push of CR. As discussed in this section, incumbent systems and standards
are likely to pose a substantial barrier to the technology-push of CR.
In the case of CR technology, it can be suggested that the technology-push may be steered along two paths. The ﬁrst
path is an incremental process of innovation by incumbent operators and vendors that might gradually propel CR
1 Mitola (2000) predicted several CR utility proﬁles, most notably opportunistic dynamic access to the radio spectrum (i.e., sharing a radio spectrum
band that would be otherwise unavailable due to its exclusive allocation to some incumbent system), more efﬁcient use of networking resources through
dynamic re-conﬁguration, and the delivery of user-aware services.
2 Suarez (2004) focuses on the dominance battle between alternative competing technologies (e.g., IBM’s PC vs. Apple’s MAC). This seems to parallel
the case of CR, which is perceived as an alternative technological design philosophy that attempts to compete with modern well-established wireless
technological architectures.
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technology to the degree of technological excellence necessary to win the position of successful industrial design and
effect the paradigmatic switch toward the new technology by means of industry consensus (Teece, 1986). The second path
is through a standardization process in which CR proponents (especially those without current stakes in the wireless
industry) push CR technology to the position of a recognized industry standard by means of formal standardization
processes that involve formal Standards Development Organizations (SDO), such as IEEE or ETSI (Delaere & Ballon, 2008).
Regarding the ﬁrst option, the process of incremental innovation is occurring, as evidenced by attention to CR technology
from existing wireless players. However, the traditional operators may be tempted to act with great caution to avoid disturbing
the status quo (as discussed in the following section). Therefore, it is likely that these operators would proceed in carefully
measured steps to ensure that any realized technological gains are harnessed as part of the toolbox of existing wireless service
offerings3 or through a carefully screened set of CR use cases that may be of interest to the incumbents (Fitch, Nekovee,
Kawade, Briggs, & Mackenzie, 2011).
In contrast, the formal standardization process might be an effective avenue of technology-push toward gaining market
recognition of the disruptive aspects of CR. However, this process is lengthy, perilous and, at times, confusing. Recent
research by Delaere and Ballon (2008) in the ﬁeld of CR standardization shows the multi-layered complexity of
standardization in the telecommunications ﬁeld. This complexity can be characterized not only by the multi-dimension-
ality of stakeholder groups and covered issues (from addressing pure technology to seeking political consensus) but also by
its overall complexity and lack of certainty. The situation is further complicated when multiple concurrent standardization
trajectories are initiated by various groups of technology proponents and in various SDO (which tends to spread the
lobbying efforts too thinly and further mire the process in complexity). These competing standards and recommendations
may, in turn, lead to the fragmentation of the markets (Fitch et al., 2011).
This situation may be observed clearly in the case of CR. Standardization efforts were initiated in several SDOs, such as
the IEEE Standards Committee DySPAN (former SCC41), IEEE 802, ETSI Technical Committee RRS, ITU-R and others. Of
these, the IEEE SC DySPAN takes the most holistic approach. However, even there (or especially there because of the
attempted wholeness of consideration), the standardization process is excruciatingly slow because it needs to reconcile
technological advancement with business and policy considerations (Granelli et al., 2010). If one considers the most
challenging issues listed by Granelli et al. (2010), then it can be observed that only one out of ﬁve (system design and
networking) represents a genuine technological challenge, whereas the other four (regulation and testing, security and two
types of malicious operational transgressions) are rooted in various aspects of operational policies to ensure the protection
of incumbent services. Furthermore, the long list of implementation challenges compiled by Fitch et al. (2011) shows a
heavy bias toward non-technical issues, including ambiguities of the standardization process.
Finally, seeking analogies in the literature on innovation management, the hindrances discussed above may be linked to
the impact of excessive bureaucracy and risk barriers (Assink, 2006). In the case of CR, these two obstacles are elevated
from a company level to an industry-wide level and are enshrined in several layers of ex ante regulatory policies, including
the harmonized allocation/pre-partitioning of the radio frequency spectrum for speciﬁc uses where particular technical
standards have established themselves as strong incumbents.
2.3. Faults of the CR market-pull
The market-pull of an innovative technology may be described as a gravitational force generated by market players that
appreciate the commercialization prospects of the new technology. The question of a credible business case is of
paramount importance when attempting to understand the gravitas of the market-pull. In the case of CR, however, the
situation may be complicated by the fact that current wireless markets are effectively locked in to the existing players and
their dominant technologies and services (Arthur, 1989).
A few early examples of CR technology road-mapping exercises (Casey, 2009; Chapin & Lehr, 2007) highlight the potential for
business propositions of CR in a speciﬁc application: the opportunistic exploitation of the spectrum used by some incumbent
services through a Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) mechanism. DSA enables nearly instant access to radio spectrum usage gaps
and is able to transcend complex and cumbersome traditional administrative spectrum allocation procedures. This is
undoubtedly appealing to the many companies wishing to enter the fray of high-proﬁle and proﬁtable wireless businesses.
However, even the great promise of DSA has failed to generate the necessary commitment and investments sufﬁcient to
overcome the challenges of CR innovation. When attempting to understand the reasons for the lack of attention by the big
companies to DSA prospects, insight may be provided by recent academic research. For instance, a study conducted by
Nguyen, Zhou, Berry, Honig, and Vohra (2011) models the economic impact of opening a new DSA-accessed spectrum for
wireless Internet service providers. It ﬁnds that the equilibrium proﬁts for incumbent service providers with licensed
spectrum may decrease as a result of the introduction of new unlicensed spectrum access, whereas the equilibrium proﬁts
for service providers that enter the unlicensed spectrum will be zero. This outcome paints a rather bleak picture that may
be described as a loss–loss situation. Moreover, if the amount of available unlicensed spectrum bandwidth is below a
certain threshold, then the overall social welfare of the provided services may actually decrease.4
3 Such as software-deﬁned base station designs offered to wireless operators; for example, see Vanu Inc. (http://www.vanu.com/).
4 Compare with the well-known concept of the tragedy of commons.
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The above example suggests that, even considering the most clearly articulated business promise of CR as a means of
opportunistic spectrum access, it is difﬁcult to gain solid ground and to drive the market-pull process in the current
spectrum management regime. Especially in the case of DSA, the incumbent ownership of the targeted spectrum remains
the main obstacle for the development of CR technologies. Thus, the traditional operators speak of being forced to allow
sharing (Fitch et al., 2011). Because the existing wireless players already have a stake in the current spectrum allocations,
they must be wary of jeopardizing the status quo with radio spectrum (and wireless market) access.
These circumstances can be observed as reverse salient barriers that increase CR innovation costs and reduce incentives
for its development. This asphyxiation of ﬂedgling CR business ideas is akin to what innovation theoreticians describe as
the technological lock-in, the adoption barrier or the stiﬂing of the status quo (Assink, 2006).
2.4. Summarizing the state-of-the-art of the CR innovation process
Based on the discussions in the previous sub-sections, the CR innovation process may be represented along a single axis
of technological transfer from R&D labs to the wireless marketplace (see Fig. 1). In this respect, it is important to note that
the effectiveness of technology-push and market-pull processes is cross-dependent (Nemet, 2009). That is, market players
hoping to realize the business potential and the gravitas of market-pull strongly prefer the clearest possible technological
scenarios.
By considering this process, the identiﬁed barriers affecting the respective technology transfer forces may be observed
as providing a compounded negative effect on the development of CR innovation. To analyze the manifestation of these
barriers, a case study is offered for one recently promoted DSA-based wireless application, the so-called White Space
Devices (WSD). These devices aim to exploit the white spaces, or gaps of virtually unused spectrum, that are present in any
transmission plan of terrestrial TV broadcasting.
In the case of WSD, the overly restrictive requirements to protect the incumbents, resulting in extremely onerous DSA
spectrum access rules, have stiﬂed the standardization process (technology-push). This has impaired the formation of the
overall technological and business concept. Presently, the business case of WSD (market-pull) remains weak (i.e., Who will
pay for free WiFi-like access?). This is well described by a provocative phrase fromWilliamWeb, who questioned whether
WSD might be a solution in search of a problem.5
Originally proposed in the US, the authorization regime for WSD6 ﬁrst envisaged semi-autonomous CR devices that
would be able to choose their operating frequency based on their own observation of spectrum occupancy (spectrum-
sensing function) and by consulting the central database of TV and other transmissions (geolocation database). However,
the original proposal sparked lengthy debates and ﬁeld experiments regarding how to ensure full protection of TV
broadcasting (and other incumbent users). As a result, the notion of autonomous WSD operation through spectrum-
sensing was largely discredited, and the WSD rules ultimately approved by the FCC allowed WSD operation on the sole
condition of being tethered to a geolocation database. The same regulatory approach is currently being replicated by
European regulators.
The technology-push processes of WSD evolution can be observed in the standardization ﬁeld, where they resulted in
the production of a recent IEEE 802.22 standard (IEEE, 2011). However, it took seven full years to develop this standard,
which offers only a glimpse of one narrowly deﬁned application, a forerunner of true CR technologies. Regarding the
market-pull forces, the industry promoting WSD development has observed large companies, such as Google, Microsoft
and Dell, joining forces within the Wireless Innovation Alliance. It seems safe to think that such companies should be
capable of assuming leadership positions and becoming champions of the technological battle, as evidenced by the
development of an industry-backed IEEE 802.22 standard (also known as Super WiFi). However, most of these companies’
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Fig. 1. Proposed interpretation of CR innovation path from R&D to diffusion, with identiﬁed barriers.
5 See W. Webb in Telecoms.com at http://www.telecoms.com/22952/the-thought-that-counts/.
6 The original FCC consultation on the possibility of utilizing TV White Spaces was begun in May 2004 and lasted until the positive FCC decision in
November 2008. The ﬁnal technical rules took another two years to ﬁnalize and were released only in September 2010.
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involvement focused on lending political clout to the petition for the new rules7 and observatory participation in a few
selected pre-CR technology pilot projects.8
3. Discussion of the future development of CR
The previous analysis described a situation in which the innovative development of CR faces an uphill technological
battle toward market recognition. The main factors that appear to lock CR development into the R&D phase are the
onerous regulatory requirements for the protection of incumbent technologies, which are further compounded by the
wary attitude of existing stakeholders. This situation may lead to a standstill, described as a chicken-and-egg dilemma in which
vendors wait for large operators to announce support for CR technology as an indication of sufﬁcient volume potential, whereas
the operators are reluctant to support new technology unless it is standardized and embraced by the manufacturers as a pre-
requisite of acceptable pricing for mass-market devices (Fomin, Medeisis, & Vitkute-Adzgauskiene, 2012).
This situation is suggestive of (market and government) failures to provide the necessary testing ground for the trial-
and-error dynamics required for efﬁcient evolutionary processes (Metcalfe, 1994). Thus, the next issue to consider could
be the type of regulatory intervention that might be considered appropriate to facilitate the innovative process of CR.
De Streel (2008) stipulates that regulatory intervention in the ﬁeld of telecommunications policies can take several
forms with varying interventional degrees. Although he distinguished four types of approaches, in comparing his proposals
with the discussion by Atkinson (2011), The authors suggest that it may be useful to recognize ﬁve types, as illustrated in Fig. 2.
The above-mentioned inclination to use an evolutionary approach as a guiding framework speaks in favor of choosing
the Schumpeterian paradigm,9 also ﬁttingly called innovation economics (Atkinson, 2011).
The Schumpeterian philosophy postulates that economic growth is spurred by innovative markets, products and
manufacturing processes (Schumpeter, 1942). As the ﬁrst to observe a proﬁtable opportunity for the use of a new
technology and to innovate, the Schumpeterian entrepreneur enjoys a temporary monopoly that rewards innovation with
excess proﬁts. Successful innovators are tracked by followers in the search for proﬁt gains, leading to intensiﬁed
competition and increased demand for inputs with limited supply.10 This results in the constant destabilization of market
equilibrium and forces new leaps in economic development. In a similarly disruptive way, CR is the potential game
changer of the entire wireless industry. However, the barriers in the CR innovation path, which are exacerbated by the lack
of easy access to suitable frequency bands, prevent any substantial opportunity for CR to push the market into a new
Schumpeterian cycle of destabilization and a subsequent innovation leap. Accordingly, governmental policy to clear that
path seems crucial. Policy failure (or, in this case, policy absenteeism) is as important as market failure (Metcalfe, 1994).
However, the utmost care should be applied to avoid making the interventional measures themselves a stiﬂing element.
Indeed, similar to any disruptive innovation, the development of CR may be described as an extremely complex process
that must be placed in a favorable business and regulatory eco-system to develop with sufﬁcient degrees of freedom
(Assink, 2006). For instance, research by de Reuver (2011) offers compelling evidence in the ﬁeld of mobile service
innovation that creativity and innovativeness is severely hampered by too many technical complexities. It is worth
remembering that ‘‘in disruptive situations, actions must be taken before careful plans are made. Because much less can be
known about what markets need or how large they can become, plans must serve a very different purpose. They must be
plans for learning rather than plans for implementation’’ (Christensen, 1997, p. 156). Similarly, Metcalfe (1994) argues that
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Fig. 2. Options of regulatory intervention to ease CR development (adapted from De Streel, 2008).
7 Google was one of the most proactive campaigners for allowingWSD access by setting up the public initiative Free the Airwaves (no longer featured
online). This was ﬁercely opposed by the broadcasting lobby, which mounted a counter-initiative of its own, referring to white spaces as Interference
Zones (see http://www.interferencezones.com/).
8 A list of ongoing trials is available at http://www.wirelessinnovationalliance.org/.
9 However, it is worth noting that although Schumpeter considered government policies pesky at times, he saw them as a necessary part of the socio-
economic landscape (Heertje, 2006). Thus, the Schumpeterian paradigm is not entirely a hands-off approach. A role for state policy remains important as
the creator and guardian of an eco-system for innovation.
10 From the full Schumpeter perspective, this process is placed in the context of increasing credit availability and macroeconomic spillovers. The
evolutionary approach (a modern parallel of Schumpeter’s analysis) adds that realized proﬁt is a major determinant of investment spending. Thus, ﬁrms
that have picked good technologies will invest (and grow) more than others.
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when problems cannot be well deﬁned, deductively rational decision processes must be replaced with inductively
experimental ones. In addition, incremental innovation is more likely to respond to demand-pulls than technology-pushes,
and non-incremental innovation is more responsive to technology-pushes (Dosi, 1988). This situation implies that if CR is
to unleash its true disruptive potential as non-incremental innovation, the enabling focus should be on the technology-
push process (which is identiﬁed as an early active force in the authors’ rendition of CR innovation process).
In the case of wireless markets, the typical intervention avenues are nearly always concerned with spectrum policies,
which provide the means for directing technological trajectories and alleviating market uncertainties. Coupled with
previous observations and reasoning, it appears that policies to ease CR innovation should be directed at opening
unconstrained learning grounds by offering a self-managed spectrum band suitable for experimentation with CR
technology. As shown above, relying on DSA to gain secondary access to a spectrum already occupied by other users
may be a critical and superﬁcial impediment to CR innovation. Recently, the idea of a dedicated CR band has been voiced in
European academic forums (COST-TERRA, 2011). The presence of a dedicated band would allow easier experimentation
and the emergence of dominant designs, which could facilitate the process of standardization and the technology-push
process. At the same time, a dedicated band would signiﬁcantly limit the exposure of ﬂedgling CR technology to the risks
of technological and market uncertainties, strengthening the basis of potentially successful innovation (Grant, 2009, esp.
chap. 12). Thus, the dedicated band could help to break the aforementioned chicken-and-egg standstill by providing a
learning platform that would facilitate the resolution of inherent uncertainties in the coordination and appropriability of
CR technology.
Another important aspect is that the dedicated CR band would reduce the risk that CR testing may cause direct
disturbances of existing markets. The separation of testing activities from commercially used bands would mean that any
possible impact in terms of operational interference or tangible reductions in the surpluses of existing consumers and
incumbents could be avoided. Thus, the dedicated frequency band for CR development appears to represent a suitable
avenue for light-touch state intervention, which would be concerned primarily with the removal of identiﬁed barriers
while preserving the status quo of existing wireless markets. Such a band could be shared by multiple CR operators/users
without the burden of protecting the highly sensitive incumbent users that provide public services, such as cellular
telephony or broadcasting. The CR band could become a learning platform to provide the necessary freedom for
experimentation, unrestricted by the need to abide by the rigorous rules for protection of incumbent systems. This would
effectively remove the identiﬁed barriers and would allow more practical experience to be gathered in using this
technology. Evolutionary forces of variety and selection would be evoked by providing necessary feedback and early
dissemination (Fig. 3).
The idea of a dedicated CR band is also attractive to the believers of the build it and they will come philosophy. When
discussing (or, rather, attempting to guess) the list of future CR applications that are likely to emerge ﬁrst, many suggest
that once the opportunities for CR deployment become transparent, novel applications will emerge by themselves (Webb,
2010). Such experiences would enliven the technology-push and market-pull forces and provide for better understanding
of CR technologies before attempting the highly ambitious prospect of self-propelled entry to the licensed frequency bands
of existing market players based solely on opportunistic spectrum access.
Providing dedicated frequency bands for innovative technologies has proven to be a wise choice that established the
technological trajectory and provided the necessary regulatory certainty for innovating companies to concentrate their
focus and investments (Anker, 2011). Successful examples of aiding innovative ideas by allocating a designated frequency
band include the allocation by the FCC of a spectrum for cellular telephony in 1970 that led to the ﬁrst commercial
deployment of a cellular system in 1983 by Bell Labs and the designation of the 2.4 GHz ISM band for spread spectrum
technologies in 1985 that paved the way for widespread WiFi systems.
Considering the opportunities for the practical implementation of the dedicated CR band concept, the currently
envisaged frequency bands where CR might develop are neither entirely appropriate nor sufﬁcient. The WSD introduction
in TV bands would be severely constrained by the need to protect the incumbent services, most importantly the highly
sensitive TV broadcasting receivers and widely used wireless microphones. The possibility of using unlicensed bands, such
as the 2.4 GHz ISM band used for WiFi operations, also offers limited opportunities due to the overloading of ISM bands
and severe transmission power restrictions (100 mW in Europe). It is suggested that a suitable dedicated CR band could be
either an identiﬁed segment of the 2.4–2.4835 GHz band, where unrestricted power would be allowed for all or some
speciﬁed classes of CR equipment, or a genuinely new, exclusive allocation, where CR could have a preferable sharing
arrangement. Such a band should be found in the spectrum below 3 GHz to allow mobility.
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Fig. 3. Proposed arrangement with optimal functioning of CR innovation forces.
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Possible candidates for this newly assigned dedicated CR band could be the little-used 1452–1492 MHz band, whose
future is currently being reviewed by European regulators, or the portions of TV band 470–862 MHz that are gradually
being freed from TV transmissions due to conversion to more efﬁcient digital TV broadcasting. Importantly, any dedicated
band should be chosen from among those bands that have a suitable set of radiocommunications services allocated to
them in the overarching regulatory statutes of the ITU Radio Regulations. For instance, ITU allocation for Land Mobile and
Fixed services in the subject band would appear to be sufﬁcient legal basis for the broadest range of innovative services
currently envisaged in the domain of CR applications.
4. Concluding remarks
The process of CR innovation is slowly progressing within a complex environment shaped by the combined workings of
technology-push and market-pull forces. However, these forces are being stiﬂed by reverse salient barriers that effectively
limit CR development.
The ﬁndings of this study support the notion that an effective means of overcoming these extant barriers and
revitalizing the innovation process for CR technologies could be for governments to designate dedicated CR band(s) with
relaxed regulatory requirements for CR-enabled technologies. These bands could become fertile ground for a ﬂourishing
innovative eco-system for this promising new wireless technology.
The designation of a dedicated CR band should consider the technical aspects of reliable system co-existence and policy
considerations of suitable regulatory regimes as well as the relevant provisions of ITU Radio Regulations. This complex
inter-disciplinary subject should be addressed by further studies.
To conclude, it might be worth recalling an insight by Nemet (2009): ‘‘Governments can [...] encourage innovation in
two ways: they can implement measures that reduce the private cost of producing innovation, technology-push, and they
can implement measures that increase the private payoff to successful innovation, demand-pull’’ (Nemet, 2009, p. 702,
italics in the original). Providing the CR innovation community with an open and unrestrained testing ground would
represent a plausible solution for effectively removing the identiﬁed innovation barriers and turning the current loss–loss
formula into a potential win–win situation.
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